• "Nonassistance" expenditures such as emergency payments, child care, transportation and other support services accounted for 70 percent of TANF funds in 2009, but recipients of these supports are not counted in the TANF caseload.
• Over half of TANF cases are now "child only," meaning adults in the household are not receiving assistance because they are ineligible or not the child's parent.
T emporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) caseloads have plummeted since the program was enacted in 1996. 1 This brief summarizes changes to the caseload during this period of decline and explores factors that have contributed to caseload change.
While the demographic characteristics of adults receiving benefits have been similar over time, the caseload has shifted, with the percentage of "child-only" cases rising to about 50 percent, while the percentage of single-parent and two-parent cases has fallen.
Factors such as the economy and the earned income tax credit (EITC) played a key role in caseload decline, but TANF policy has had a substantial impact. Specific TANF policies such as financial incentives, sanctions, and time limits help explain changes in caseload exits and entries and overall caseload size. Variation in state TANF policies and other state characteristics contribute to wide differences in program outcomes across the country.
As TANF caseloads remain low, even in a recession, we need more research on why fewer eligible families are taking up TANF benefits than did so historically. 1979 1981 1983 1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 Number of families (in millions) 
What is the Size and Shape of the Caseload?
In an average month in 1997, 3.94 million families (10.4 million individuals) were receiving TANF. This number had fallen to 1.95 million by 2011, a decline of 50 percent (figure 1). 2 The steepest enrollment decline happened in the first five years of the pro gram, with gradual declines continuing until the recent recession began in 2007. The number of families increased during the recent recession, from 1.91 million at the beginning of the recession in December 2007 to a peak of 1.94 million in December 2010, an increase of 17 percent. The national caseload remains lower than it was in 2005 before the recession.
State Caseloads Vary
TANF caseloads have declined steeply in most states ( 
Participation rates Have Declined
TANF caseload decline can be attributed both to more families leaving TANF and to fewer eligible families participating. The "takeup rate" gauges the number of families receiving TANF assistance relative to the number eligible for benefits. This rate has declined from a high of 86 percent in 1992 to 79 percent in 1996 to 36 percent in 2007, the most recent year available. 4 While boom economic times in the late 1990s may have reduced eligibility, takeup rates among eli gibles declined even during this period and continued to decline. A similar decreasing trend has occurred in the percentage of poor families with children receiving TANF. 5 The steep decline in program participation sug gests that many families are choosing not to receive TANF assistance, do not know they are eligible, find it difficult to enroll, or are being otherwise diverted.
Nonassistance and State Actions Affect the Caseload Counts
TANF caseload data count only the number of individuals receiving TANF cash assis tance. States also fund other services and supports through TANF, technically called "nonassistance," and recipients of these are not counted as part of the TANF caseload.
Nonassistance includes support services to lowincome employed families such as child care and transportation assistance, work subsidies paid to employers, and employment services for families not receiv ing cash assistance. Nonassistance funds can also be used for other programs that help lowincome families, such as state EITC and state child welfare services.
TANF diversion payment programs are another form of "nonassistance." These pro grams provide applicants eligible for TANF lumpsum payments, typically worth one to four months of regular benefits, in lieu of enrolling them in TANF cash assistance. Diversion programs aim to keep families 7 Changes in the TANF caseload reflect only the number of households receiving cash assistance and do not take into account the number of people receiving nonassistance. States report the amount of funds spent on nonassistance activities but not the number of recipients receiving nonassistance benefits and services. Some nonassistance functions as a substitute for cash assistance (e.g., EITCs, lumpsum pay ments, and work subsidies), while other nonassistance, though potentially important, does not (e.g., childwelfarerelated expendi tures and employment services).
Two common state practices related to the TANF work participation rate also affect the formal caseload count. Some states move select cases from TANF into "solely statefunded" (SSF) programs, to pro vide more individualized services, to reduce the state's risk of receiving a federal penalty for failing to meet work participation requirements, or both. SSF families receive TANFlike assistance but are not subject to TANF rules, are not counted toward the work participation rate, and are not reported as TANF cases. A survey found that 28 states had SSF programs in 2008, although it is not known how many cases are in these programs. 8 Additionally, some states use TANF funds to provide small earnings supplements in order to keep working recipients on the caseload and to increase their work partici pation rate. 9 The net effect of these two A small portion of the TANF caseload is twoparent families and the share has not changed appreciably over time, falling from about 7 to 5 percent between 1997 and 2009. However, the number of twoparent families receiving assistance has fallen 42 percent from 1997. 13 Research has found that twoparent families are less likely to be eligible for TANF due mainly to higher incomes. They are also less likely to participate if eligible, although the reason is not clear. 14 Twoparent cases are tracked separately in part because they are sub ject to higher work participation requirements. These higher requirements have led some states to move these cases into SSF programs, which means that declines in the caseload since 2005 may overstate declines in the number of twoparent families receiving cash assistance.
Demographic Characteristics of Caseload Largely Unchanged
As the large decline in the caseload unfolded, questions arose as to whether the composi tion of the remaining caseload would change. Many argued that if those most work ready exited, the remaining caseload would be more work challenged. But available evi dence suggests that there has been little change in caseload characteristics. This may be because not all of those exiting the case load left with employment. One study exam ining changes in recipients' characteristics through the mid2000s concluded that demographic characteristics had changed lit tle since TANF passed, although average edu cation levels were sensitive to economic cycles. This study also reported little evi dence of increased barriers to work among the caseload, with the exception of some increase in health problems or disability. 15 Another study focusing on TANF recipients in two states through 2005 also found limited change in demographic characteristics. 16 Administrative data also indicate few changes in caseload characteristics comparing 1998, 2005, and 2009 (table 2). The share of recipients who are over 39 and those who are not U.S. citizens has decreased. The share who are Hispanic has increased. With respect to factors that might make work more diffi cult, there has been a slight increase in the number of recipients with infants but an increase in those with high school or more education. Many of the barriers we would like to measure are not present in available national data sources, such as criminal record, substance abuse, domestic violence, low functional literacy or learning disability, and child with health problems (beyond receipt of Supplemental Security Income).
What factors explain Caseload Changes?
The size and composition of the caseload could be changing for many reasons. Families' need for TANF cash assistance can vary with the economy and the availability of alterna tive support programs. Program rules can create incentives or disincentives to enroll in TANF. Program practice "on the ground" can also affect the size of the caseload by making it more or less difficult to enroll and affecting families' attitudes about enrollment.
TANf Program and the economy Affect Caseloads
Numerous studies address the relative impor tance of different factors in explaining case load changes. Many focus on explaining the dramatic decline in caseloads around the time of TANF enactment. 17 These studies typically use statistical techniques to try to separate the effect of the economy from the effect of TANF policy on caseload decline. These stud ies generally agree that declining unemploy ment and the improving economy in the late 1990s were important determinants of case load decline but could not account for a large part of the postTANF caseload decline. These studies conclude that TANF policy in aggre gate explains a sizeable part (roughly 20 per cent) of the decline in caseloads. Changes in other policies, primarily the EITC, also have important impacts on welfare caseloads. 18 There has been limited study of caseload change in more recent years. 19 One excep tion addresses the responsiveness of TANF caseloads to economic cycles and includes data from the recent recession. 20 The authors conclude the TANF caseload is less responsive (or at least no more responsive) to economic changes than the cash welfare caseload was prior to welfare reform.
Specific TANf Policies Affect Caseloads
Specific TANF policies can have different impacts on caseloads. Some TANF policies serve to increase the caseload, such as finan cial incentives that allow workers to keep more of their earnings while retaining bene fits, keeping families on the caseload longer. Others can have the opposite effect. Low benefit levels and mandated work activities make receipt of TANF less attractive. Stringent benefit reduction sanctions for failing to comply with requirementsincluding full family sanctions that eliminate
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the entire benefit-are designed to incen tivize behavior, but can also lead to the cre ation of childonly units or the elimination of cases altogether. 21 Time limit policies also affect the caseload. Federal law prohibits the use of federal TANF funds to provide assis tance after a family receives 60 months of benefits, with some allowable exemptions. Individual states can impose even shorter time limits on benefit receipt. Time limits reduce caseloads directly when families hit the time limit, but can also reduce caseloads indirectly if families exit the program more quickly to save months for future use.
Evidence has been reviewed elsewhere on the impact of specific provisions from stud ies of the period immediately following TANF enactment and from states with fed eral program waivers prior to that. 22 The studies generally find that financial incentive policies increase caseloads, with more gener ous incentives leading to greater increases. As expected, mandatory work requirements, stronger sanctions, and time limits generally reduce welfare use and caseloads.
A few more recent studies support these earlier findings. One study using caseload data up to 2005 found sanctions, time limits, and diversion policies were associated with decreases in caseloads and more generous financial incentives with increases in case loads, although these impacts were modest. Taken together they explain only 10 percent age points of the 56 percentage point decline. 23 Another study finds that time lim its reduce welfare use, especially among fam ilies with young children. This impact result arises from a behavioral response to the exis tence of the limit rather than families reach ing the time limit. 24 The actual number of cases closed due to state or federal time lim its has been small. One study found that about 250,000 cases had been closed due to time limits from 1996 to 2008, although about onethird of those were in New York State, where most families reaching the time limit are transferred to a state and locally funded benefit program. Across the country, in an average month in FY 2009 only about 2 percent of cases were closed due to state or federal time limits. 25 This number may be increasing as several states have implemented shorter time limits in recent years.
Work diversion programs requiring applicants to participate in certain activities (usually job search during a 30 to 45day application period) before enrollment can also reduce caseloads. In 2010, 21 states had these "upfront" job search requirements. 26 The extent to which these programs impact the caseload is unclear.
An additional factor influencing caseloads and takeup rates, beyond the specific policies, is the implementation of policy, or as one author puts it, "the policy as delivered by front line workers." 27 A study of four states' imple mentation of welfare reform finds that the passage of TANF led frontline workers to con sistently relate to clients the requirement to work even across very different state programs. In some states, such as Texas and Georgia, work requirements for applicants were used explicitly to divert recipients from the caseload. Whether the goal was diversion or application, this study finds that from the perspective of frontline workers, the most important factor in caseload decline was restricted access to TANF through the work mandate. 28
How Long Do families Stay on Welfare?
Changes in the level and characteristics of the TANF caseload reflect a combination of changes in entries and exits and the length of time families remain on the caseload. Specific TANF policies affecting decisions to enter or leave the caseload (the dynamics of the caseload) can operate in complex ways. For example, policies that encourage work and increase exits may also discourage entry.
A number of studies analyzing the relative roles of entries and exits in explaining caseload declines after the passage of TANF generally show that decreasing TANF entries played an important role in caseload decline, although increasing exits explain the majority of the decline. Other studies examining the impact of changes in welfare policies, other support programs, and the economy on entries and exits find that welfare reform significantly increased exits. The results on entry are more mixed. The economy and the expansion of the EITC both seem to reduce entry more than welfare policy. 29 However, all these results are from the early years after TANF passed. There is little evidence using more recent data.
Available data suggest that a large share of those who enroll in TANF remain on for short periods and a small share remain on for long periods. Federal data on the number of months current cases have accrued toward the federal 60month time limit provide a snap shot of recent spell lengths in progress. Excluding childonly cases, 41 percent of FY 2009 cases had accrued less than a year and another 23 percent less than two years toward the 60 month limit. Only 12 percent had accu mulated more than four years. 30 The same data show that only 2 percent of cases were closed due to time limits. There is some evi dence that individuals with characteristics that may make work more difficult (such as health problems, low education, and young children) are more likely to remain on TANF longer. 31 Another facet of caseload dynamics is fami lies who leave the rolls and subsequently return to welfare. High rates of rapid returns suggest those exiting have not been able to reach self sufficiency. Lower rates of return could reflect less need for assistance or difficulty accessing the program. One study finds that returns within two years of exiting fell from 26 percent in 1997 to 21 percent in 2002. 32 Another study in two states finds that returns fell initially after TANF passed and then began to increase through 2005. They find the impact of eco nomic conditions and individual characteristics remained largely unchanged over this time. 33
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This suggests the initial decline and subsequent increases in returns may be due to welfare poli cies, although other unmeasured factors could also play a role.
What Are the implications for State and federal Policy?
The major implication for state and federal TANF policy of the research is that the large changes embodied in TANF had major impacts on the caseload independent of the economy. Some evidence suggests differential effects of specific policies. Financial incentives in the form of earnings supplements lengthen stays on the rolls, while other policies such as sanctions, diversion, time limits, and work mandates reduce caseloads.
That TANF takeup rates have declined continuously along with caseloads shows it is not just declining eligibility that is reducing caseloads, but fewer eligible families taking up these benefits. Understanding why and what this indicates about the TANF program is important. That caseloads remain relatively low even in a severe recession also requires scrutiny as to whether the program's trans formed work focus is meeting families' needs.
The large share of childonly cases raises questions about appropriate services, bene fits, and program rules. Most of these fami lies do not fit into a workfocused program, and nonparent caretakers may benefit from specialized supports. 34 The stability in caseload characteristics suggests that even as caseload numbers declined, the mix of lowincome families receiving assistance has not been greatly impacted. However, many barriers of interest are not measured in available data, and some evidence shows increases in the share of the caseload with health problems. Research still cannot fully answer whether those with seri ous employment barriers more often leave the caseload due to failures to comply with com plex rules or whether they find ample sup ports outside of TANF. 35 The increasing share of disconnected parents among lowincome families suggests some failures in the TANF program's ability to serve those in need. 36
Areas for future research
Much of the research on caseloads hails from the very early years after TANF passed and the waiver years prior to passage. The lack of more recent research that takes advantage of the more than 15 years that have now passed means several key issues for the TANF program are not fully understood. These include the impact of eliminating the entitlement to TANF (cash assistance) dur ing a recession and the continued decline in participation among TANF eligibles. As TANF caseloads remain low, even in a reces sion, we need more research on why fewer eligible families are taking up TANF benefits than did so historically. The availability of TANF data for an entire business cycle now allows study of TANF's responsiveness over the business cycle. This issue and many oth ers discussed above deserve additional research with this longer time frame. 37 More analysis on the differential impact of policies on entry and exit is also warranted, par ticularly to understand the dramatic declines in takeup rates. Research that separates the role of changes in eligibility (monetary and nonmone tary) from changes in application rates and their effects on specific policies is important for understanding takeup. In particular, it is important to understand the impact of full family sanctions, time limits, and diversion pro grams on declining takeup rates separate from families not connecting with the program at all. Joint analysis of eligibility and participation in the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program and TANF may be informative as well. Direct survey of eligible nonrecipients' knowl edge of the program and reasons for not apply ing would also be informative, although it is difficult to identify these families.
In general, as TANF provides employ ment and other services and supports, we need to understand their impact in helping families remain off welfare. "Welfaretowork" experiments have given us some evidence of shortterm changes in welfare use, but most of these are dated. We need research that examines whether families that exit TANF are reducing their dependency and increasing selfsufficiency. While this research involves measurement of outcomes beyond the case load, it includes better understanding of fam ilies cycling on and off TANF. We know little about the likelihood of families returning to welfare since the mid2000s and how this varies by family characteristics and experiences.
A basic research question is how to inter pret federally reported caseload numbers that exclude those receiving nonassistance TANF payments or solely statefunded benefits. Research is needed on the effects of these pay ment policies on lowincome families. For example, should systematic information be collected on diversion program payment receipt or receipt of solely statefunded bene fits? One dimension of reporting being exam ined by the federal government is more detailed reporting of nonassistance. Congress required states to provide the federal govern ment more detailed information in spring 2011, although reporting of numbers served was not required. 38 Finally, one of the most important aspects of TANF policy was the flexibility afforded states. The differences that have arisen in policy choices have played a role in researchers' ability to examine the impact of different policies on caseloads and other outcomes. However, more recent changes (since the Deficit Reduction Act) have not been exploited by researchers to as great a degree, and our understanding of why caseload patterns diverge so tremendously across states in more recent years is limited. The large concentration of the national caseload in a few states also calls for more research focused on these states in particular.
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